نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی - پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 استادیار مؤسسۀ آموزش عالی بیمۀ اکو، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی
2 کارشناسی ارشد توسعۀ اقتصادی و برنامهریزی، مؤسسۀ آموزش عالی بیمۀ اکو، دانشگاه علامه طباطبائی (نویسندۀ مسئول)
چکیده
کلیدواژهها
عنوان مقاله [English]
نویسندگان [English]
The conventional theory of adverse selection in markets with asymmetric information expects that the anti-choice phenomenon occurs. Hence, bad products beat good products out of the market. Consequently, a reduction in market efficiency may lead to market failure. Insurance market is among the markets in which this phenomenon can happen. However, in the 90s a number of researchers reported occurrence of advantageous selection in the insurance market. These researchers have shown that if by focusing on risk aversion of individuals and their willingness to do precautionary effort, a negative correlation exists between risk aversion and risk taking, and also between coverage and claim and a positive correlation is observed between precautionary effort and coverage, then we can conclude that there is an advantageous selection in that field of insurance; so claims of omission of good customer from the market with asymmetric information will be rejected. This paper examines the advantageous selection in the Iranian automobile collision insurance market and concludes that there exists considerable advantageous selection behavior in this market and precautionary efforts affects market performance and prevent market failure
کلیدواژهها [English]